The article discusses outreach practices of Russian universities in former Soviet republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus as a part of Russia's public diplomacy effort. Perceiving the competitive environment of international education in the Commonwealth of Independent States in terms of geopolitical rivalry, the Russian government encourages state-owned universities to recruit more students and establish partnerships in this strategic region. As a result, focusing on Central Asia and the Caucasus for international student recruitment, Russian higher educational institutions not only pursue higher reputation and tuition revenues, but also perform as public diplomacy actors, supplementing and sometimes substituting the activities of official institutions.
Introduction
Many scholars associate the rise of Russian public diplomacy in the 2000s with emergence of new media and engagement of the world's leading public relations agencies into the promotion of a positive image of Russia and its leaders. The most common examples of Russia's 'charm offensive' are the establishment of the RT (previously Russia Today) TV channel (2005), contracts with Ketchum, Inc., or President Dmitry Medvedev's blogging initiatives. However, the 're-branding Russia' campaign has shown mixed results, and the absence of both institutionalization and long-term strategic vision made Russia's new public diplomacy expensive and essentially ineffective. 1 The research is mostly based on the in-depth analysis of Russian and international statistics on international student flows to the Russian HEIs from countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus, namely the data collected by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation in [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] (Table 1 ) and country reports on global flow of tertiary level students by UNESCO Institute of Statistics (Table 2) . Addressing political texts, including legislation on the Russian compatriots, speeches and claims by the Russian leaders and members of the government, as well as interviews and articles by Rossotrudnichestvo officials, along with conceptual documents on foreign policy and national security, becomes a must to illustrate the growing interdependence between higher education, which is generally thought in terms of domestic affairs, and foreign policy. This is especially the case with the most recent version of the "Strategy of National Security of the Russian Federation" (2015), which labels higher education export and support of the Russian language use and studies in the CIS as national security priorities until 2020. 6 The research is also supplemented by in-person interviews conducted among Russian international education administrators from Moscow, St. Petersburg, Arkhangelsk, Barnaul, Kazan, Krasnoyarsk, Novosobirsk, Pskov, Tomsk, Tyumen, Vladivostok, and Yoshkar-Ola during practical interaction from 2012 to 2015, including the author's working visits to international education fairs and university presentations in Almaty, Astana, Baku, Tashkent, and Yerevan. Discussions and interviews with the staff of the Russian Centers for Science and Culture and representatives of associations of Russian compatriots in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan also gave a lot of valuable information to estimate the scale and efficiency of the Russian public diplomacy by receiving a feedback from both practicing diplomats and target groups. Some important information on perception of Russian public diplomacy by foreign audience came from academic colleagues from Al-Farabi Kazakh National University and the German-Kazakh University in Almaty, Nazarbaev University in Astana, Qafqaz University in Baku, and Armenian State University in Yerevan. Finally, interviews with students coming from republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus (with exception of Georgia) now studying at Kazan Federal University, Mari State University and Volga State University of Technology in Yoshkar-Ola were very useful, too. 
Juxtaposing Public Diplomacy and International Education
For the purposes of this article, international education is defined as "the informal, nonformal, and formal educational relationships among peoples of various nation-states", without focusing on global issues transcending national boundaries, otherwise necessary for a more complete definition. 7 International students constitute foreign nationals who left their country of origin and moved to another country for the purpose of study. This definition is borrowed from the glossary adopted by the OECD, which also defines international students as students who are not permanent or usual residents of their country of study or alternatively as students who obtained their prior education in a different country.
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International educational exchanges play a crucial role in public diplomacy. As academic discipline, international education reviews exchanges as worthy goals in and of themselves, beyond politics and ideologies; however, educational and cultural endeavors are integral part of public diplomacy, and also components of propaganda. 9 The effectiveness of international education as a tool of public diplomacy is difficult to measure. Educational exchanges will be effective only when they function in coordination with foreign policies that promote international cooperation. Because of the 'human factor' exchanges are particularly vulnerable in an antagonistic political context. Yet in the right circumstances they can achieve significant changes in attitude. 10 Inclusion of educational exchanges into public diplomacy guidelines (for the United States, by 1961 Fulbright-Hays Act and 1979 Foreign Relations Authorization Act) marked the government interest for international education as a foreign policy tool, or "long-range educational and cultural policies".
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The correlation between international education, public diplomacy, and (especially) propaganda is trickier. For the US, the confusion around international education seen as propaganda may historically stem from close contacts between diplomats from the State Department and USIA. Some cultural programmes were transferred from the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs to USIA (commonly seen as a propaganda unit), and in 1978 the Bureau merged with USIA. However, in Fulbright-funded and other US cultural exchange programmes "close linkages with information or "propaganda" aims of USIA were to be avoided". 12 The 'uncomfortable question' of connection between international education and propaganda is still shadowing the discussion on international education policies, and Russia's contemporary efforts in particular.
Discussing Russia's public diplomacy is a challenging task. First, defining the terminology is an issue. So far, there is no consensus on the term 'public diplomacy' within Russian domestic community of international relations theorists and practitioners. While there are some conventional interpretations that give credentials to the US origins of 'public diplomacy' cliché, quite commonly, Russian literature intentionally refers to narodnaya diplomatiya or obschestvennaya diplomatiya instead of publichnaya diplomatiya (transfer from English 'public diplomacy') in attempt to avoid foreign loanwords 13 . However, the trick does not work, because Russian substitutes linguistically frame 'public' either as non-governmental organizations, or societies and communities, thus limiting applications of public diplomacy to areas like people-to-people, or NGO diplomacy, or paradiplomacy 14 . Furthermore, the concept of gumanitarnoe sotrudnichestvo ('humanitarian cooperation') often appears in the literature and official documents, referring to activities that involve developing cultural ties, creating crosscivilizational dialogue, civil society support and assistance to compatriots living abroad.
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The other major relevant concept in this discussion is soft power, which has become widespread in Russian literature. However, many Russian authors perceive Nye's concept with excessive suspiciousness 16 . The predominantly Realist paradigm of Russian domestic discourse places both soft power and public diplomacy in the context of geopolitical rivalry, with the West, and the US in particular. Therefore, direct references to Nye's works sometimes find their way into President Vladimir Putin's speeches:
The notion of 'soft power' is being used increasingly often. This implies a matrix of tools and methods to reach foreign policy goals without the use of arms but by exerting information and other levers of influence. Regrettably, these methods are being used all too frequently to develop and provoke extremist, separatist and nationalistic attitudes, to manipulate the public and to conduct direct interference in the domestic policy of sovereign countries. There must be a clear division between freedom of speech and normal political activity, on the one hand, and illegal instruments of 'soft power', on the other. 17 Another distinctive feature of the Russian texts is that there are no prejudices against mixing public diplomacy, soft power, and propaganda. Quite often these three terms are used as synonymous in the same context, especially in political speeches. 18 This circumstance may puzzle Western readers and give grounds for general assessments of the new Russia's public diplomacy as revitalization of Soviet propaganda. Such assumptions are partially true, as historically the term 'propaganda' in Russian did not carry strictly negative connotation, and referred to any means and tools of public communication and persuasion, not necessarily manipulative or deliberately deceitful. The derivative verb propagandirovat' (to propagandize) is also very characteristic for the Russian texts on public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and soft power, meaning 'to promote' or 'to advocate for'. Linguistic and cultural aspects of terminology are important, as they reflect the society's attitudes on the public diplomacy phenomenon, and eventually have an impact on international education practices.
International Education in Global Political Context: The Russian Prospective
The Cold War race for international students might be the best illustration of complementarities between international education and public diplomacy. Both East and West considered higher education as a key tool for finding allies and combating rival ideologies. Soon after World War II, US cultural relations programmes including educational exchanges began to be organized and designed in accordance with the national security interest.
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The US public diplomacy flexibly combined short-term exchanges for current and prospective foreign leaders such as International Visitor Leadership Program and Eisenhower Fellowships, and scholarship opportunities for full-length degree studies for international students (e.g. Fulbright Program), and was quite persistent and successful over the years, Soviet Union practiced the approach similar to the one of the USA, attracting thousands of students from socialist-oriented developing countries under the slogans of communism and antiimperialist solidarity. Even overloaded with Marxist propaganda, the Soviet model of international student recruitment was able to compete with the West, making the USSR the third most popular study destination in the world by the end of the 1980s (after the United States and France). 1991, non-communist Russia abandoned its ambitions for global educational leadership. Russia ceased large scale assistance programmes in developing countries and pro-communist parties and movements in Africa, Asia, and Latin America that the USSR had led for decades. Drastic domestic social and economic changes in the 1990s had a negative impact on Russia's international image. If in 1990 the total number of foreign students in Soviet universities reached its peak of 126,500, most of them studying in the RSFSR (Russia). 21 Just in a year, this number dropped to 89,400, and then, by 1996, even lower to 59,600.
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It took Russia several years to recover from transitional shock of market economy reforms and political instability. The stream of incoming international students started to grow slowly from the mid-1990s, allowing Russia to return to the top ten countries leading in international education. So, in the years 2009-2010 Russia was ranked seventh among the world's top international education destinations, behind the USA, UK, Germany, France, Australia and Canada, and slightly ahead of Japan. 23 The United States still leads the pack, with 974,926 international students enrolled at US institutions of higher education in the academic year 2014/2015, leaving competitors far behind. 24 The geopolitical changes in the last two decades had a serious impact on the structure of international student body on Russian campuses. Students from the former Soviet republics in Russia instantly became foreign nationals. Neither these students, nor the international services at Russian universities were ready for such radical changes. By inertia, Russian universities did not practice outreach recruiting in the former Soviet republics for many years. The advantages of going to Russia to study in the 1990s were doubtful; the Russian universities did not need advertise their programmes to former Soviet citizens, because the educational systems were quite the same. The new state borders brought new political, economic and legal obstacles for the academic mobility in traditional, previously domestic routes within the Soviet Union (e.g. between South-West Russia and the Ukraine, the Urals and Kazakhstan, etc). The only group of 'international' students that showed increased presence in Russian universities in the 1990s were ethnic Russian migrants (actually, people of various ethnicities but mainly Russian speakers) from the former Soviet republics. Of more than eight million ethnic Russian migrants from the former USSR between 1990 and 2003, half came from the five Central Asian republicsKazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan -which were home to more than one third of this Russian 'diaspora'. 25 The constitutional right to free higher education -on a competitive basis -was (and still is) a strong incentive for migrants from the former Soviet republics to obtain citizenship through naturalization in the Russian Federation. As a rule, ethnic Russian migrant students sooner or later achieved Russian citizenship this way, thus losing their status of 'foreigners' (and distorting data on international student enrollment).
Ethnic Russian students from the new independent states were generally regarded as 'Russian compatriots' (or sootechestvenniki), although, in Russia's case, a compatriot is "any citizen of the former Soviet Union, even if he or she, or their forebears never lived in the RSFSR (now the Russian Federation)", a meaningful note in the Federal Law of 1999 on compatriots abroad. 26 Article 17 of this Law described the measures to support compatriots in defence of their 28 Furthermore, since the late 1990s, the share of CIS citizens as part of the total international student body in Russian universities has slowly but constantly grown, and constituted 51,9% in the academic year 2013/2014: twice bigger than 26,6 % from the AsiaPacific region, the biggest international student 'supplier' in the world (over 2/3 of which came from China, Vietnam, and India). Russia's return to the regional geopolitics in Central Asia and the Caucasus in the mid2000s implied not only competition for natural resources like oil and gas, or shaping new economic and military alliances, but also attempts to strengthen the positions of the Russian language and education there. Russia's motivation in the post-Soviet politics was actually much deeper than economic integration or assistance development. As Yelena Osipova pinpoints, the desire to re-establish, reinforce and build upon already existing and deeply held historical ties with the former Soviet republics is inevitably interrelated with the primary focus of the Russian foreign policy on the CIS. 30 Moreover, President Putin in his Annual Address to the Federal Assembly in 2005 stated that Russia should continue its "civilizing mission" on the Eurasian continent.
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Later in 2010, President Dmitry Medvedev stressed that Russia can capitalize on the existing bond with the former Soviet republics and emphasis on further CIS integration to achieve its objectives in foreign policy, and public diplomacy in particular.
32 By the late 2000s, as the post-Soviet space became the main priority area for the Kremlin's foreign policy, most cultural and educational programmes were concentrated in this region. Inspired by the geopolitical thinking, the Kremlin perceived underrepresentation of Russia's higher education and the progressive decrease of the use of the Russian language in the former Soviet republics as a threat to Russia's national security interests. Russia's weakening cultural influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus was thus considered as a result of effective public diplomacy of some rival foreign nations, to which Russia had to respond. According to Russkiy Mir Foundation website, the US, European, Turkish or Chinese academic exchange programmes and educational establishments undermine Russia's traditional academic and cultural hegemony in the 'near abroad'. 33 With the course of time, securitization of the use of the Russian language in the CIS, along with the global reputation of the Russian higher education became obvious when they appeared in the "Strategy of National Security of the Russian Federation" signed by the President Vladimir Putin on the eve of 2016. The document labels the necessity to increase "export of Russian high quality education", first of all, to the member states of the CIS, and to raise the attractiveness of the Russian language as a medium of training on global level, among national security priorities until 2020.
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International Education Actors in Central Asia and the South Caucasus
Indeed, the 1990s were the time when many international education actors came to Central Asia and the Caucasus to explore the new market with total population of more than 82 million. Apart from transborder academic mobility between the countries of the region, some major international student flows go to Belarus, and, especially, Ukraine. These two countries, which occurred to be in a similar economic and demographic situation as Russia, started active marketing in Central Asia and the Caucasus offering affordable study programmes with Russian as a language of instruction, thus becoming most serious competitors to the Russian universities (see Table 2 ). 35 After the collapse of the Soviet Union Turkey expanded its educational programmes and Turkish language studies in the former USSR under the motto of 'brotherhood of Turkic nations' (Azeri, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Turkmens, and Uzbeks). Conversion from Cyrillic to Latin alphabet in post-Soviet Azerbaijan and many countries of Central Asia was one of the visible signs of independence and return to the pan-Turkic solidarity. Since 1991, with governmental or private funds, Turkey has founded a number of joint higher education institutions in the region, such as Qafqaz University in Baku, or the International Atatürk-Alatoo University in Bishkek.
The United States were also paying much attention to the development of educational exchanges within their public diplomacy for the newly-independent states. Apart from various US Department of State programmes (Fulbright, Freedom Support Act, IREX UGRAD, etc), numerous American Corners and EducationUSA advising centers started to provide guidance on admission to American universities and colleges in every country of Central Asia and the Caucasus.
Another issue that Russian HEIs faced in the region was the decreased popularity of the Russian language in Central Asia and the Caucasus, as well as the increased popularity of English. Knowledge of English opens possibilities for work in international businesses, NGOs with foreign ties, or for employment in the 'far abroad'; the jobs often offering significantly higher salaries than other available options. A good command of English is also needed for some 35 In Belarus, Russian is one of the two official languages, and a dominant language of higher education. In Ukraine, Russian is the language of instruction "on choice" in higher education. See: "Why study in Ukraine?" Ukranian International Education Council, available online at http://uiec.org/en/education-in-ukraine/why-study-in-ukraine of the best educational opportunities inside Central Asia, such as the American University of Central Asia (Bishkek), the newly established Nazarbayev University (Astana), and the three campuses of the Aga Khan supported University of Central Asia (Khorog in Tajikistan, Naryn in Kyrgyzstan and Tekeli in Kazakhstan). In Kazakhstan, the government has set the goal for 20% of the country's population to have a mastery of English by 2020. 36 In Azerbaijan, many newly founded private universities follow the organizational model of Western, primarily US and European universities and colleges. These schools were pioneering English as the language of instruction, and designed Bachelor's, Master's and doctoral degree programmes in affiliation with American or British universities. Table 2) .
The emergence of these new international players in Central Asia and the Caucasus put an end to the monopoly of national educational systems, which retained quite a few elements from the old Soviet system, and was therefore tied with the Russian academic tradition. Hence, the Russian universities faced a challenge of a new diverse higher education landscape, where they had to compete not only with national universities of the new independent states, but also with academically stronger and richer schools from around the globe. The Russian language, despite significant reduction of use, remained a powerful marketing tool for the former USSR. Many national universities in Central Asia, for instance, still keep it as primary or second language of instruction, usually parallel to native-language student groups (or 'streams'). Though the Russian streams are generally a small minority in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, they are broadly viewed as superior. 
Russian Universities' Engagement in Public Diplomacy
Until the late 2000s, Russia's foreign policy guidelines had rather little to say about 'higher education export'. With little funds available as state scholarships, limited information on study opportunities, and understrengthened network of counter agents abroad, Russian universities could not adequately compete with their US, European, or Asia-Pacific counterparts. Situation started to change by 2008, when international academic cooperation was first featured in the conceptual documents on Russia's foreign policy.
The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (2008) signed by the President Dmitry Medvedev first mentioned public diplomacy among other tools of the "information support for foreign policy activities" to promote "an objective image of the Russian Federation globally" as well as the "Russian language and the Russian peoples' culture". 41 The Concept of 2008 once again named the CIS Russia's foreign policy main priority area. It also contained a special notice on support of cultural and education rights of ethnic Russian communities living abroad. The Concept welcomed reintegration of national education systems of the post-Soviet states, as "reestablishment and development of the common cultural and civilization heritage".
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In the same year, the Russian government expanded the scholarship programme subsidizing foreign nationals studying at Russian universities to 10,000 per academic year. 43 Previously, the number of scholarship recipients (or the 'quota') was fixed as 3,000 in 1995, and 7,000 in 2003 respectively. 44 To increase the share of the CIS citizens among recipients of the governmental scholarship, the Ministry of Education and Science and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation redistributed yearly country quotas, subsidizing more incoming students from the post-Soviet states, at the expense of the rest of the world.
The distribution of international students coming to Russia on the governmental quota is a complicated process that sometimes triggers disputes in the Russian academic community, as the domestic competition for incoming students is also high: in the academic year 2013/2014, for example, more than 156 thousand foreign citizens were studying full-time in 673 Russian universities (Table 1) . Although the Ministry of Education and Science adopted a clear system of online application for the scholarship, where a candidate can list the subject areas and universities of choice in priority order, the final distribution of students between regions, cities, and institutions is decided by the ministry, and highly depends on university status (federal, national research, or "general"), its position in various Russian and international educational rankings, and public reputation. Previous experience of educating foreign citizens, and availability of the department of Russian as foreign language, also count. Thus, the geographic distribution of international students throughout Russia is rather misbalanced: almost half of them stay in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Most of international students are enrolled in the four year Bakalavriat (Bachelor's degree) (38,1 %) and five year Specialist Diploma programmes (27,7 %). Short term academic exchanges give 14,8 % of total number; only 7 % study in Magistratura (Master's degree), and postgraduate studies in Aspirantura and Doktorantura are even less demanded. 45 There were several reasons why Russian universities consider the CIS countries as their priority transboundary market. First, the post-Soviet states are geographically and culturally closer to Russia; the Russian language still serves a means of communication with local public, not to mention multiple communities of ethnic Russians living abroad. Second, during the two decades of independence countries like Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have reached a sufficient level of economic stability, and the new middle class young can afford to study abroad -and many choose Russia -again, because of the language of instruction, geographic proximity, and affordability of the tuition. Third, the Russian universities have to become more 'foreignerfriendly' and internationally open because of the changing demographic situation within the country. The decline in birth rates in Russia in the early 1990s turned into significant decrease of high school graduates by the mid-2000s, so the universities have to 'fight' for every applicant. At the same time, Central Asia with its high birth rates, gradually became home to the most mobile student population, and has experienced a steady rise in the number of students studying abroad: from 67,300 in 2003 to 156,600 in 2012. According to UNESCO observations, these figures suggest that domestic tertiary enrolment has not kept pace with the growing demand for higher education. 46 Another major factor was the ongoing higher education reform, which put many Russian universities, especially small and medium-sized, at the brink of collapse. The project of creation of nine Federal universities "on the basis of optimizing regional educational structures" meant merger of the weaker actors by huge new entities. 47 A new quality assurance policy by the Ministry of Education and Science also implied yearly monitoring of international cooperation development, including rates of international student enrolment. Trying to keep getting federal funding and sustain their domestic and international reputation, the universities explore new markets for prospective foreign students. Under these circumstances, attraction of students from the former USSR, many of whom are Russian speakers, might look the best possible solution.
The growth of federal subsidies to enroll CIS citizens implied the necessity of serious structural changes in the marketing policies for Russia's higher education. The creation of the Rossotrudnichestvo in September 2008 provided a linkage between foreign policy and universities, as this new public diplomacy institution under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was obliged to promote Russian higher education worldwide, thus making Russian universities more capable of self-promotion abroad. Thus, after 2008, the task of international student recruitment was to be shared by the universities themselves, the Ministry of Education and Science (distributing the country quotas for the government scholarships), and Rossotrudnichestvo, which had to communicate with foreign public directly to recruit prospective students.
The offices of Rossotrudnichestvo abroad could amend country quotas, as in many developing countries (in Asia or Africa) the demand for Russian tertiary education always exceeds supply, while in developed countries (e.g. in Europe or North America) public interest toward Russian degree programmes is somewhat sporadic. With limited human and material resources, the new agency had to collaborate with universities, offering technical and organizational support in their marketing campaigns beyond Russia. In turn, state universities were advised to recruit prospective students from the countries of primary geopolitical importance. In other words, universities had to follow governmental foreign policy guidelines.
Rossotrudnichestvo has inherited a network of Russian Centers of Science and Culture (RSSC) from the Soviet times, most of which were small cultural offices or libraries operating at Russian diplomatic missions abroad. 48 In 2009-2011, Rossotrudnichestvo started to modernize existing RSSC, while many brand new Russian Centers were open predominantly in CIS countries. Farit Mukhametshin, the first director of Rossotrudnichestvo (and former Russian Ambassador to Uzbekistan), once said that the RSSC must represent "Russia's face abroad". 49 He also emphasized, that the Russian government should increase the funding of Russian Centers, thus creating a viable competitor to the British Council of the UK, the Goethe-Institut of Germany, the Cervantes Institute of Spain, Alliance française of France and Confucius Institute of China. 50 From the very beginning of their operation in Central Asia and the Caucasus, the RSSC became the main advertising sites for Russia's higher education, and acted as local counter agents for many Russian HEIs. This collaboration was a win-win process: Rossotrudnichestvo tried to reach more prospective international students (first of all, the Russian compatriots), while the universities were authorized to select the applicants, and used governmental resources to position themselves in CIS educational markets.
After 51 The RSSC also operate as information points (or 'kiosks'), where universities send their promotion materials for further dissemination among prospective students.
Second, many local offices of Rossotrudnichestvo arrange joint expositions of Russian universities within periodic international educational exhibitions, fairs, and festivals (like 'Education and Career', 'Education Abroad', or 'World of Education', etc.). If some rich universities prefer to perform on their own, many smaller schools can only afford to represent themselves under the brand of Rossotrudnichestvo, participating in fairs for free, or at discounted rates, and thus accessing the countries where they otherwise could hardly appear.
Third, the Rossotrudnichestvo facilitates contacts between universities and local proRussian NGOs, mainly Russian cultural societies, foundations, centers and clubs working under the umbrella of the Russian embassies, or supported by the Russkiy Mir Foundation. Formally, the numbers of such structures may look quite impressive; however, Konstantin Kosachev (the director of Rossotrudnichestvo in 2012-2015) had to admit that the 'army' of more than 5,000 pro-Russian non-governmental organizations worldwide, including 859 international ones, sometimes operates less effectively than "several U.S. or European foundations". 52 A noteworthy feature is a network of joint Slavonic Universities, which operate on the basis of bilateral intergovernmental agreements under the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the host country. Russian-Armenian (Slavonic) University in Yerevan, Russian-Tajik (Slavonic) University in Dushanbe, and Kyrgyz-Russian (Slavonic) University in Bishkek offer study programmes in Russian, based on the Russian learning standards. As Fierman notes, all Russian-language higher educational institutions in Central Asia "enjoy superior reputations". 53 Altogether, by 2015 more than 25 Russian HEIs, primarily branches of state universities operated in Central Asia and the Caucasus (with exception of Turkmenistan) (see Table 3 ). This number used to be much higher at the expense of private HEIs, many of which provided mostly part-time and distant learning programmes, and sometimes had no premises, teaching and research equipment, or even worked without necessary licenses. Several branches of Russian universities abroad, both public and . 54 Moreover, in 2014 the Russian Minister of Education and Science Dmitry Livanov promised to disband the "low quality" branches of the Russian universities abroad, stressing their negative impact on the reputation of the Russian higher education, and Russia's international image. 55 Nevertheless, such higher education establishments still make Russia's presence in the CIS visible and interactive. The future of Russia's public diplomacy in Central Asia and the Caucasus will certainly imply extension of higher education initiatives and launch of new exchange programmes based on international practices. For instance, in 2008 the Shanghai Cooperation Organization established its own university, actually a networking mobility scheme including 82 HEIs in Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 56 Conceptually the SCO University is modeled after the well-known Erasmus mobility programme in Europe. Promoting the advantages of the Eurasian integration, the Rossotrudnichestvo is now stressing the need to introduce "new approaches" toward Russia's public diplomacy, addressing the 'thinking class' in the target countries with explanations of the advantages of the Customs Union, and then the newly formed Eurasian Economic Community. Along with this, Russia is also keeping the ambitious task to extend the global network of the Russian Centers on 100 countries, continue to support pro-Russian NGOs, and promote the Russian language studies and cultural diplomacy initiatives.
57 From 2012, the Russian universities have been authorized to sign bilateral cooperation agreements with the Rossotrudnichestvo, and work out joint action plans of their outreach activities based on the RSSC 58 . Of special note is attention that Rossotrudnichestvo, along with the Ministry of Education and Science and Ministry of Foreign Affairs are paying to restore the ties with numerous alumni of the Soviet and Russian universities worldwide. The government supported several initiatives on creating associations, arranging international get-together forums, group visits of foreign graduates to their home universities in Russia, and attracting successful alumni to various outreach activities in their home countries. The Alumni Association of Soviet/Russian 56 See SCO University website at http://uni-sco.com/ 57 K. Kosachev. 'Rossotrudnichestvo', pp. 188-189. 58 Otbor inostrannykh grazhdan na obuchenie v vuzakh Rossii. Rossotrudnichestvo official website, 11 April 2014, available online at: http://rs.gov.ru/node/877 Academic Institutions is an 'umbrella' structure for 50 country associations, two of which operate in the CIS (Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan). 59 The degree of engagement of Russian universities into governmental public diplomacy, as well as the general dependence of HEIs on foreign policy guidelines, is very high. Probably, it is best illustrated by the case with the Russian sanctions against Turkey after downing of a Russian warplane over Syrian border on November 24, 2015. In a week after the incident, more than forty Russian universities quit their academic cooperation ties with Turkish partners after receiving "urgent recommendations" from the Ministry of Education and Science. 60 
Conclusion
The new politics of the international student recruitment by joint efforts of the Russian universities and the Rossotrudnichestvo resulted in the increased number of governmentprovided scholarship recipients coming primarily from the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus. By 2015, the CIS citizens constitute more than a half of all full-time international students in Russia (Table 1) . Adding part-time students who visit Russia only for short (one-two weeks) assessment sessions in the end of each semester rises the share of the CIS nationals in Russian HEIs up to 68,8 %. 61 In 2013 the Russian government increased the quota for foreign students at Russian institutions from 10,000 to 15,000per year. 62 Sponsoring additional five thousand international students will cost the Russian federal budget about 206 million rubles in 2016. In 2015 the Ministry of Education and Science proposed to increase the quota for foreign students on scholarship up to twenty thousand, with total programme budget set to grow to 4-5 billion rubles by 2019. To justify the increase, the Ministry referred to Rossotrudnichestvo, which received more than 16,000 applications for the Russian governmental scholarships for the academic year 2014/2015 from 160 countries. However, the economic difficulties faced by the country since 2014 forced the government to prorogue these ambitious plans. 63 Russia's political class considers national higher education, along with the use of the Russian language, as a valuable resource of the nation's influence in changing political context of the world as a whole, and Eurasia in particular. Claiming a great power status, Russia does not only try to prove its diplomatic or military capabilities, but also endeavors to project its soft power on neighboring nations, perceiving and using educational exchanges as a valuable tool of public diplomacy. No wonder that Russian diplomats and international educators often address foreign publics together.
Thus, coping with Central Asia and the Caucasus, Russian universities do not only work for their own economic interest and reputation, but also perform as public diplomacy institutions, supplementing and substituting for the activities of official institutions. Such interdependence between educational and diplomatic entities constructs a distinct style of international education practices of Russian universities, and Russia's public diplomacy in the region. 
